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.
MAKING A CASE FOR AN AGE-SENSITIVE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Milford Central School District opened its school 
building after normal school sessions to use by the community 
for activities related to "instruction in any branch of education, 
learning or the arts" and for "social, civic and recreational 
meetings and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining 
to the welfare of the community."1 This community use policy 
was developed pursuant to New York Education Laws § 414, 
which gives local school boards the authority to "adopt 
reasonable regulations" governing the use of school property for 
public purposes.2 The Milford community use policy also 
contained the restriction that school property could not be used 
for religious purposes.3 
The Good News Club, a group whose self-proclaimed 
purpose is to "instruct children in family values and morals 
from a Christian perspective,"4 sought permission to hold their 
weekly meetings in the Milford Central School building after 
the close of the regular school day. 5 The Club previously met at 
the Milford Center Community Bible Church, and the Milford 
School District provided students with bus transportation to 
the meetings. The district had, however, discontinued the bus 
1. The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001). 
2. N.Y. Educ. Laws § 414 (McKinney 2000). 
3. Good News, 533 U.S. 98, 102. New York Education Laws§ 414 lists specific 
uses to which school facilities may be put, although it does not specifically include or 
exclude use of the buildings by religious organizations or for religious purposes. The 
statute mentions religion in two contexts, stating that admission fees charged for 
activities occurring in the school building may not benefit religious organizations and 
that graduation exercises held by the school may not include a religious service. The 
validity of the use policy exclusion of religious use was not an issue in this case, 
although an argument could be made that such a restriction was not authorized by the 
statute. 
4. The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (N.D.N.Y 
1998). 
5. Id. 
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service in 1996.6 
The interim superintendent denied the Club's request to 
use the school building on the ground that the content of club 
meetings was "the equivalent of religious worship."7 In arriving 
at this characterization of the Club's activities, the 
superintendent relied on materials provided by the Club that 
were used in teaching lessons at Club meetings. 8 The Milford 
school board later upheld the superintendent's decision. 9 The 
Club brought suit, alleging that the school board's refusal to 
allow them use of the building infringed upon their free speech 
rights. 10 The district court granted summary judgment for 
Milford, finding that the Club engaged in religious instruction 
and that the proposed use was therefore in violation of the use 
policy.11 The Second Circuit affirmed;12 the Club appealed, and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13 
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court held that 
Milford violated Club members' free speech rights by denying 
them access to the school building after regular school 
sessions. 14 The Court reasoned that while Milford had 
established a limited public forum from which some forms of 
speech might be excluded, speech could not be barred from the 
forum solely on the basis of its viewpoint. 15 The Court held that 
6. /d. 
7. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103. 
8. The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 507 (2d. Cir. 2000). An 
excerpt, included in the district court's opinion is characteristic of the nature of these 
materials. In one lesson, outlined in a guide for teachers, children are to be instructed 
that "If you have received the Lord Jesus as your Saviour from sin, you belong to God's 
special group - His family .... If you obey God, you'll not be ashamed when the Lord 
Jesus comes .... Just as the Lord Jesus rose again from the dead, those who believe in 
Him will also be raised from their graves. If you should die before the Lord Jesus comes 
again, your body will be placed in a grave. But when he gives the signal, your body will 
be raised from the grave; it will be changed into a body like that of the Lord Jesus; and 
you will be caught up to meet Him in the air .... When you tell someone of the Lord 
Jesus and he receives Him as Saviour from sin, both of you are made glad. If a person 
does not receive the Lord Jesus as Saviour, he will not be able to go to Heaven." Good 
News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56. 
9. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103. 
10. Id. The Club initially also made arguments under Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, but the Court 
only considered the free speech issue. !d. at 98. 
11. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 160. 
12. Good News, 202 F.3d at 504. 
13. Good News, 533 U.S. at 98. 
14. Id. at 102. 
15. Id. at 107. 
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by denying the Club access to the school building, Milford 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination because it allowed other 
groups that addressed the social and moral development of 
children to meet in the building. 16 The Court also rejected 
Milford's Establishment Clause defense, stating that Milford 
could not legitimately argue that allowing the Club to meet in 
the school building would lead to the perception that the school 
endorsed the Club's activities or that the community would feel 
coerced to participate in them.17 In coming to this decision, the 
Court rejected the argument that the age of the children 
involved required special consideration of the Establishment 
Clause issue.18 
The purpose of this article is to show that the Court should 
have considered the age of the children involved in this case in 
determining whether permitting the Club to meet in the school 
would violate the Establishment Clause and to propose a test 
that would allow the Court to make an age sensitive 
determination without deviating from established precedent. 
Part II gives an overview of recent cases considering 
Establishment Clause challenges to a religious presence in 
public schools to highlight the factors the Court has used in 
deciding these cases. Part III briefly reviews free speech 
jurisprudence in public schools as an example of an area of 
constitutional interpretation where the Court has considered 
the age of schoolchildren in determining the scope of a 
constitutional right. Part IV proffers arguments that the Court 
should consider the age of the audience of a religious message 
in Establishment Clause cases, both from dicta in previous 
cases and from the various amicus briefs submitted in support 
of Milford. Part V outlines an age-sensitive Establishment 
Clause test for use in public school cases. 
II. CURRENT STATE OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has consistently struggled with 
Establishment Clause cases.19 The Court has developed a 
16. ld. at 111. 
17. ld. at 113-114. 
18. ld. at 114-115. 
19. See Ronna G. Schneider, Getting Help with Their Homework: Schools, Lower 
Courts, and the Supreme Court Justices Look for Answers Under the Establishment 
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number of tests in deciding these cases, and the individual 
justices have widely varying opinions as to how Establishment 
Clause challenges to state action should be decided.20 The most 
concrete Establishment Clause test was constructed by the 
court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 21 The Lemon test outlined three 
factors to use in determining whether government action 
constituted an impermissible establishment of religion. A 
violation was found if: (1) the action did not have a secular 
purpose, (2) the action had a primary effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion, and (3) the action involved excessive 
government entanglement with religion.22 The Court has since 
strayed from Lemon without officially overruling it, leaving 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in a mild state of 
confusion.23 
A. 
In 1990, in 
relying solely 
Establishment 
Board of Education v. Mergens24 
Board of Education v. Mergens, the Court, 
on the Lemon test, denied a school's 
Clause defense. The Court considered a 
Clause, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 943, 943-44 (2001) ("Yet the Court's Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, at least in the last two decades, has lacked clarity, certainty, and 
consistency. The Court's last decision of the century and the first three decisions of the 
new millennium illustrate this judicial dissention. An analysis of those four Supreme 
Court decisions, as well as the lower court decisions that have subsequently grappled 
with Establishment Clause issues in the school context reflect the Court's sometimes 
shifting, and usually divided, Establishment Clause jurisprudence."); Lisa 
Langendorfer, Comment, Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705, 705 (1999) ("The 
Establishment Clause has been greatly litigated, with more than seventy cases decided 
by the United States Supreme Court since the 1940s, yet the Court has been unable to 
agree for any amount of time on a standard method for determining if the 
Establishment Clause has been violated."). 
20. Schneider, supra n. 19 at 956-57 (discussing the various positions of the 
Justices on Establishment Clause issues); Langendorfer, supra n. 19 (outlining the 
tests used in Establishment Clause cases and explaining the perspective of each 
current justice on this issue); Penny J. Meyers, Note, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: 
Using the Lemon Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School 
Graduation Ceremonies, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 231 (1999) (reviewing the various tests used 
in Establishment Clause cases). 
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
22. Id. at 612-13. 
23. Schneider, supra n. 19, at 960-95 (analyzing lower courts' struggle to apply 
the Court's inconsistent Establishment Clause precedent); Langendorfer, supra n. 19, 
at 709-10 (discussing the Court's failure to use the Lemon test consistently). 
24. 496 u.s. 226 (1990). 
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challenge to the Equal Access Act,25 which prohibits public 
secondary schools that receive federal funding from denying 
access to a limited public forum by student groups based on the 
content of the speech expressed at their meetings.26 The Court 
found that each of the factors of the Lemon test were met and 
subsequently rejected the school's Establishment Clause 
argument.27 The Court concluded that the Act's purpose of 
preventing discrimination on the basis of speech was a 
sufficient secular purpose.28 In determining whether the Act 
had a primary effect of advancing religion, the Court 
considered whether there was a risk that students in the school 
would perceive government endorsement of religion by allowing 
such groups to hold meetings in the building.29 The Court held 
that high school students were mature enough to understand 
that schools "do not endorse everything they fail to censor" and 
that the Act's requirement that school officials not participate 
in religious group meetings obviated any further risk that 
students would perceive endorsement.30 The Court also held 
that having a faculty member oversee meetings for 
administrative purposes did not amount to excessive 
government entanglement with religion. 31 
B. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District32 
The Court's analysis in Lamb's Chapel presents a move 
away from the Lemon test. Lamb's Chapel applied to use school 
facilities to show a film series offering a religious perspective 
on child-rearing and other family issues.33 The school district 
denied the request because of the religious content of the 
films. 34 The district argued on appeal that allowing the films to 
25. 20 u.s.c. § 4071 (2001). 
26. 20 U.S. C. § 4071(a) (2001). 
27. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-49. 
28. I d. 
29. Id. at 250. 
30. Id. at 250-51. 
31. ld. at 253. 
32. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
33. ld. at 388. 
34. ld at 389. The school district had adopted a community use policy that 
prohibited use of school facilities "by any group for religious purposes," pursuant to 
state law. Id. at 387. 
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be shown in the school would violate the Establishment 
Clause.35 
In rejecting the Establishment Clause justification for 
denying Lamb's Chapel access to the school facilities, the Court 
referred to the Lemon test and held that the state action in this 
case was permissible.36 The Court did not engage in an in-depth 
application of the Lemon factors to the facts of this case but 
simply referred to the test and stated that it rendered the 
district's action impermissible.37 The Court instead focused on 
why there was no danger of the community perceiving 
government endorsement of religion if the school allowed the 
film series to be presented by the church.38 Because the films 
were to be shown after school hours and would have been open 
to the public, and considering that the building had been used 
for other community purposes, the Court reasoned that 
perception of endorsement was not a reasonable fear in this 
case. 39 The Court also stated that any benefit to religion "would 
have been no more than incidental."40 
While the majority in this decision seemed to silently 
discredit Lemon, Justice Scalia's concurrence directly voiced his 
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test. In his concurring opinion, 
Scalia harshly criticized the majority for using the Lemon test, 
arguing that six of the nine justices had rejected the test in 
previous cases.41 He accused the Court of arbitrarily applying 
Lemon to regulate government action. 42 
35. !d. at 395. 
36. !d. 
37. !d. 
38. !d. (In considering endorsement, the Court relied on its opinion in Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981), where the Court stated that the challenged 
government activities did not "endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired 
there.") The Widmar Court did, however, base its decision on the Lemon test. Id. at 
271. 
39. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. 
40. !d. 
41. !d. at 398 ("As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in 
a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after 
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center 
Moriches Union Free School District."). 
42. !d. at 399. 
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C. Rosenberger v. TheUniversity o{Virginia43 
Following the Court's lukewarm treatment of the Lemon 
test in Lamb's Chapel, its decision in Rosenberger marked a 
further departure from this precedent. In this case, student 
editors of a religious magazine brought suit against the 
University for refusing to fund the publication, alleging, inter 
alia, that refusal based on the content of the magazine violated 
their free speech and press rights. 44 The University defended its 
action as necessary to avoid violating the Establishment 
Clause.45 
In rejecting the University's argument, the Court omitted 
any direct reference to Lemon, focusing instead on the concept 
of neutrality and stating that a government program that is 
neutral towards religion will not violate the Establishment 
Clause.46 The Court determined that a government program 
that extends benefits to all groups, regardless of religious 
content or perspective, ensures the desired neutrality.47 The 
Court alluded to some of the Lemon factors, stating that a court 
must determine the purpose of the action48 and must consider 
the effects of the action, although the effects inquiry was 
framed in terms of perception of endorsement.49 While the 
Court briefly mentioned these other considerations, the holding 
was based on the neutrality concern.50 
D. Good News 51 
By the time the Court heard Good News, there was no clear 
method for deciding Establishment Clause cases challenging 
religious group access to public schools. The Court seemed to 
43. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
44. ld. at 827. The group also argued that the University's actions violated their 
free exercise of religion and created an equal protection problem. Id. 
45. ld. at 828. 
46. Id. at 839. 
47. I d. 
48. ld. at 838-39. 
49. ld. at 841-42. 
50. ld. at 845-6. ("The neutrality commanded of the State by the separate 
Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by the University's course of 
action .... That course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk 
fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very 
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires."). 
51. Good News, 533 U.S. 98. 
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have taken Justice Scalia's admonitions in Lamb's Chapel to 
heart and implicitly put the Lemon test to rest in Rosenberger. 
Lamb's Chapel emphasized the importance of limiting any 
perception of government endorsement of a religious message 
in schools while Rosenberger added the element of government 
neutrality towards religion. In Good News, the Court's 
application of both factors led to its conclusion that allowing 
the Good News Club (hereinafter "Club") to meet in the school 
building did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
1. Neutrality 
The Court flatly rejected any suggestion that Milford's 
refusal to allow the Club access to the school met the neutrality 
requirement. 52 In fact, the Court expressed concern that the 
community would perceive government hostility towards 
religion if the school district was allowed to prohibit the Club 
from using school facilities for its meetings. 53 While the Court 
did not expressly label it as such, this concern is related to 
neutrality. Because other groups were permitted to use the 
school building according to the community use policy, the 
Court found that reasonable members of the public could 
interpret a prohibition of religious groups as an expression of 
government hostility toward such groups. 54 
2. Endorsement 
The Court's consideration of the endorsement issue in Good 
News had two components: (1) the risk of perception of school 
endorsement and (2) a corresponding risk that the community 
would subsequently feel coerced to participate in the religious 
activities.55 The Court considered the coercion issue first and 
decided that the relevant audience for its inquiry was the 
parents of the elementary school children, because the children 
needed their parents' permission to attend Club meetings.56 
52. ld. at 114 ("The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated 
neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups. Because 
allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, 
Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to 
exclude the Good News Club."). 
53. Id. at 118. 
54. Id. 
55. ld. at 114-15. 
56. Id. at 115. 
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The Court concluded that it was not reasonable to argue that 
the parents of Milford school children would believe that the 
school supported the religious message of the Club. 57 The Court 
then stated that the need for parental permission obviated any 
risk that the children would be coerced into participating in 
Club activities. 58 The Court reasoned that the children could 
not be coerced because their parents would not be confused 
about endorsement. 
Mter deciding that the parents were the only relevant 
audience, the Court went on to address the argument that the 
children themselves would perceive school sponsorship of the 
Club.59 The Court found that there were insufficient facts to 
demonstrate that children attending the school would be 
affected by the presence of the Club.60 The Court concluded its 
Establishment Clause discussion on a harsh note, stating that 
even if there was a risk that the children would perceive 
endorsement, this would not be sufficient to uphold Milford's 
rejection of the Club: "We decline to employ Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto, in which 
a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of 
what the youngest members of the audience might 
misperceive. "61 
While the Court repeatedly asserted that the decisions in 
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger compelled the holding in Good 
News, 62 the facts of these previous cases are distinguishable. 
The Court could reasonably have held that Milford's actions 
were .justified without calling into question the continued 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. ld. at 117-18. 
60. Id. (The Court's reasoning for this assertion is somewhat confusing. This 
section addresses both children who would be Club members and those who just attend 
the regular sessions of the school but doesn't clearly differentiate between the two in 
describing what facts control. "There is no evidence that young children are permitted 
to loiter outside classrooms after the school day has ended. Surely even young children 
are aware of events for which their parents must sign permission forms. The meetings 
were held in a combined high school resource room and middle school special education 
room, not in an elementary school classroom. The instructors are not schoolteachers. 
And the children in the group are not all the same age as in the normal classroom 
setting; their ages range from six to twelve."). 
61. ld. 
62. Id. at 107 (in the context of viewpoint discrimination), 113-16 (in the context 
of the Establishment Clause). 
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viability of these cases. 63 The Court could have used this case 
as an opportunity to clean up Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and create a test for use in public school cases 
that would offer guidance to lower courts and local school 
boards. 
E. A New Approach 
The Supreme Court has attempted to develop one test for 
use in all Establishment Clause cases. The Lemon test, 
although the most organized of these attempts, has proved 
insufficient for general use, as evidenced by the Court's 
selective use of its factors. 64 In recent Establishment Clause 
cases, the Court has, in effect, used different tests for different 
kinds of cases without acknowledging or providing a coherent 
explanation for its reasons for doing so, as the previous 
discussion of relevant cases suggests. 65 
In her concurrence in Board of Education v. Grumet,66 
Justice O'Connor recognized the Court's unwillingness to use 
Lemon in all circumstances and its struggle to compose a 
63. The challenged religious activity in Lamb's Chapel was to take place in the 
evening and was intended for adults, not the children who attended the school. Lamb's 
Chapel u. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1992). This is 
distinguishable from Milford, where the Good News Club sought access to the children 
themselves. Rosenberger can easily be distinguished on the facts because it dealt with a 
college, rather than an elementary school. The students were much older and the 
religious presence was introduced by members of the college community, rather than 
an outside religious organization, as was the case in Milford. The Court in Rosenberger 
also had to consider the effects of their decision on freedom of the press, as the activity 
in question was the publication of a student newspaper. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835. 
64. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Over the years, 
however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own 
opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's [the Lemon test] heart ... 
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so ... when we wish to strike down a practice it 
forbids, we invoke it. . . when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it 
entirely."); see e.g. Schneider, supra n. 19, 944-45 (describing how Justice O'Connor 
adjusted the prongs of the Lemon test in deciding Agostini u. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997)). 
65. See e.g. William F. Cox, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause 
and its Application to Education, 13 Regent U. L. Rev. 111, 122 (2000-2001) ("A 
uniform standard for interpreting the Establishment Clause has escaped the Supreme 
Court. Sometimes, for instance, parochial institutions and/or attendees are denied 
monies or resources because they foster religious orientation. At other times, similar 
resources are allowed for parochial institutions because to instill safeguards to keep 
the resources pointed in a secular direction constitutes excessive entanglement with 
religion that is equally unconstitutional."). 
66. 512 u.s. 687 (1994). 
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singular test for use in Establishment Clause cases.67 She 
warned that attempting to stretch one rule to accommodate all 
Establishment Clause cases may have negative effects on this 
jurisprudence: "And setting forth a unitary test for a broad set 
of cases may sometimes do more harm than good. Any test that 
must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague 
as to be useless."68 O'Connor argued that the Court should be 
willing to develop different tests for different kinds of 
Establishment Clause cases: 
But the same constitutional principal may operate very 
differently in different contexts. We have, for instance, 
no one Free Speech Clause test. We have different tests 
for content-based speech restrictions, for content-
neutral speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by 
the government acting as employer, for restrictions in 
nonpublic fora, and so on. This simply reflects the 
necessary recognition that the interests relevant to the 
Free Speech Clause inquiry - personal liberty, an 
informed citizenry, government efficiency, public order, 
and so on - are present in different degrees in each 
context. 69 
The Court should look to First Amendment jurisprudence 
for guidance in establishing a new Establishment Clause 
approach. As Justice O'Connor noted, the area of free speech is 
one in which the Court has developed multiple tests for 
determining whether the government has violated individual 
rights. This is also an area where the Court has considered the 
age of the audience of a particular message in determining 
whether the speaker should be able to express their message in 
a given forum. 70 The next section of this paper briefly reviews 
free speech jurisprudence in public school cases as an example 
of how the Court could approach the Establishment Clause. 
III. FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
The quintessential student speech case is Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, decided in 
67. ld. at 718 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
68. ld. 
69. ld. 
70. See infra Part III (discussing free speech cases where the Court considers the 
age of the audience). 
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1969.71 In this case, a handful of students wore black armbands 
to school to show their objection to the Vietnam War.72 The 
principal of the school learned of the plan to wear the 
armbands and adopted a school policy that any student 
wearing one would be suspended until he or she returned to 
school without it.73 The students in this case wore the 
armbands despite the policy and were suspended from school 
for almost a month.74 The students brought suit challenging 
this policy on the ground that it violated their right to free 
speech.75 
The Supreme Court recognized the students' First 
Amendment right to free speech and found the school policy to 
be unconstitutional.76 The Court's reasoning can be 
summarized in the oft-cited quote: "It can hardly be argued 
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'m 
Tlie Court further stated that such a stifling of student speech 
or expression can only be justified where the school 
administrators have reason to think that such speech would 
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."78 
Since deciding Tinker, the Court has qualified the right of 
students to uninhibited speech in public schools. In two 
subsequent cases, the Court upheld restrictions on student 
speech, largely due to concerns for the younger members of the 
audience. 
A. Bethel School District v. Fraser79 
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court recognized 
that the age of an audience was an essential consideration in 
situations where a student's right to free speech was asserted. 
Matthew Fraser, a high school student, made a speech 
nominating one of his friends as a candidate for student 
71. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
72. Id. at 504. 
73. ld. 
74. ld. 
75. Id. 
76. ld. at 514. 
77. ld. at 506. 
78. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
79. 478 u.s. 675 (1986). 
257] AGE-SENSITIVE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST 269 
government at an assembly that all students were required to 
attend.80 He was later suspended because school administrators 
considered his speech to be obscene, therefore violating a 
disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene or profane 
language. 81 Fraser brought suit challenging his suspension, 
arguing that the school's action violated his right to freedom of 
speech.82 
The Court upheld the school's disciplinary action.83 
Acknowledging that Tinker protected student speech, the Court 
also recognized that "the constitutional rights of students in 
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights 
of adults in other settings."84 The Court asserted that school 
officials have the authority to prohibit or punish speech that 
"would undermine the school's basic educational mission."85 In 
support of its holding, the Court referred to a number of cases 
where it limited First Amendment rights in order to protect 
children from sexually explicit speech.86 In deciding Fraser, the 
Court emphasized the potentially negative effects of Fraser's 
speech on the younger students in attendance: "The speech 
could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, 
many of whom were only fourteen years old and on the 
threshold of awareness of human sexuality."87 
The Fraser Court also recognized the school's role as 
protector of children when acting in loco parentis.88 Considering 
the advisability of judicial intervention in these cases, the 
Court stated that the school board is the most appropriate body 
to make decisions concerning whether certain types of speech 
are acceptable in public schools.89 
80. I d. at 677. 
81. Id. at 678. 
82. I d. at 679. 
83. I d. at 685. 
84. I d. at 682 (citing New Jersey u. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)). 
85. Id. at 685. 
86. Id. at 684-85. (referring to Ginsberg u. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a 
statute banning the sale of sexually explicit material to minors); Bd. of Educ. u. Pico, 
457 U.S. 853 (1982) (allowing a school board to remove books from a school library that 
are "vulgar"); F.C.C. u. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (rejecting the argument 
that a radio station has a right to broadcast vulgarity and giving weight to the fact that 
the specific broadcast in question was aired at a time when children would be 
listening).). 
87. Id. at 683. 
88. Id. at 684. 
89. Id. at 683. 
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B. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier90 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court took 
Fraser one step further, allowing school officials to prohibit 
certain kinds of speech in student newspapers.91 Here, the 
school principal decided that two articles intended for 
publication in the paper were inappropriate and ordered them 
removed.92 The Court relied heavily on Fraser's reasoning in 
upholding the principal's action, again emphasizing that 
educational decisions are the responsibility of local 
communities, not federal judges,93 and expressing concern that 
the material was not appropriate for a less mature audience.94 
This consideration of the maturity of the audience of the 
articles was even extended to potential readers who did not 
attend the school, such as younger brothers and sisters.95 The 
Court also expressed an endorsement concern: 
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over 
this ... form of student expression [student publications] 
to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners 
are not exposed to materials that may be inappropriate 
for their level of maturity, and that the views of the 
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the 
school. 96 
C. Analysis 
A review of these free speech cases shows that the Supreme 
Court is willing to consider the age of an audience in 
determining the scope of a speaker's right to free expression. 
Where particular forms of speech may disrupt the school 
90. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
91. Id. at 276. 
92. Id. at 264. One article described three students' experiences with pregnancy 
and the principal was concerned both that the identity of these students would be 
obvious from the context of the story and that the material was inappropriate for 
younger students. The other article described one student's experience with divorce, 
and the principal concluded that the story unfairly portrayed one of the parents 
without allowing either parent to respond to the story or to consent to its publication. 
Id. at 263. 
93. ld. at 273. 
94. Id. at 271. 
95. ld. at 274-275. 
96. ld. at 271. 
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environment or have negative effects on younger students, the 
Court will limit the breadth of this fundamental First 
Amendment right. 
In light of this aspect of the Court's free speech 
jurisprudence, its refusal to make a parallel inquiry in the 
Establishment Clause context appears disingenuous. As 
discussed earlier, the Court, in Milford, refused to consider the 
perspective of the children in order to prevent using a 
"modified heckler's veto" where the possible misperceptions of 
the youngest members of an audience mandated restriction of 
the challenged activities.97 Yet, this is exactly what the Court 
has done in the free speech context. The cases above illustrate 
that the Court is willing to censor speech for the sake of the 
youngest ears that may hear it. The Court's refusal to do so in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence without distinguishing 
these two areas of law is simply inconsistent. 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION OF AGE IN 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES 
A. Previous Supreme Court Statements Considering Age in 
Establishment Clause Cases 
The suggestion that the Court consider the age of the 
audience of a religious message when determining if there is an 
Establishment Clause violation is not a new one. The Court 
made statements to this effect in dicta in a number of recent 
cases. In Edwards v. Aguillard,98 the Court acknowledged that 
there are special concerns when applying the Lemon test in the 
context of an elementary or secondary schooV9 In other cases, 
the Court addressed the age of the audience when considering 
the specific elements of Establishment Clause inquiries: 
endorsement, coercion, and neutrality. 
97. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Court's reasoning in Milford). 
98. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
99. ld. at 583-84 ("The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring 
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. 
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their 
trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance 
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her 
family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is 
involuntary."). Edwards v. Aguillard was overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997), but this piece of dicta remains instructive. 
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The Court has referenced age when determining whether 
state action would create a perception of endorsement. In 
considering whether there was a likelihood of perceived 
endorsement of religion with a state program that provided 
classes to nonpublic (mostly sectarian religious) school students 
in the public schools, the Court specifically considered the age 
of the children in attendance at the public school: 
The inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted 
with particular care when many of the citizens 
perceiving the governmental message are children in 
their formative years. The symbolism of a union 
between church and state is most likely to influence 
children of tender years, whose experience is limited 
and whose beliefs consequently are the function of 
environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.100 
Additionally, in Mergens/01 the Court used the age of the 
students to support the contention that there was no 
reasonable concern that the students attending the high school 
would perceive endorsement: "We think that secondary school 
students are mature enough and are likely to understand that 
a school does not endorse or support student speech that it 
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."102 
The Court also considered age relevant when determining 
whether individuals would feel coerced by a state action 
relating to religion. In Tilton v. Richardson103 the Court stated 
that college students "are less impressionable and less 
susceptible to religious indoctrination."104 The older age of an 
audience was relied on again in Marsh v. Chambers105 when a 
state congressperson challenged the practice of opening each 
legislative day with a prayer: "Here, the individual claiming 
injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily 
susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer pressure."106 In 
both of these cases, the Court used the age of the audience to 
support the holding that there was no Establishment Clause 
violation. The Court concluded that the individuals in these 
100. Sch. Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985). 
101. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). See supra Part II.A. discussing Mergens. 
102. !d. at 250. 
103. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
104. !d. at 686. 
105. 463 u.s. 783, 792 (1983). 
106. Id. 
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cases were mature enough that they would not be easily 
coerced by the activities of others. 
The Court also used age in considering whether 
government action was neutral toward religion. The Court used 
age in Widmar u. Vincent to support their holding of no 
Establishment Clause violation. This time when considering 
the neutrality of a state policy, the Court noted: "[u]niversity 
students are, of course, young adults. They are less 
impressionable than younger students and should be able to 
appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality 
toward religion."107 
B. Arguments of Amicus Curiae in Good News 
A number of religious, civil liberties, and school 
administration organizations submitted amicus briefs to the 
Court in support of Milford's actions denying the Good News 
Club access to the school facilities. Many of these organizations 
argued that the age of the children in this case made such 
action necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause 
for two main reasons: (1) that young children are more 
impressionable than high school and college students, and (2) 
that Congress made age relevant when enacting the Equal 
Access Act. 
Some of these organizations cited psychological research 
indicating that children age six to twelve are less cognitively 
mature than older students and are therefore more likely to 
perceive school endorsement of any activities that take place in 
the school.108 Psychologist Jean Piaget concluded that pre-
adolescent children are not able to "think on an abstract logical 
level, to reason by hypothesis, and to engage in independent 
analysis."109 Psychologist Eric Erikson found that a child of this 
age "lacks the ability to make distinctions between his views, 
others' views, and the views of his school."11° Children, being 
107. 454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 14 (1981). 
108. Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League; Hadassah - The Women's 
Zionist Organization of America, Inc.; National Coalition for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty; and National Council of Jewish Women at 20-21, Good News (No. 
99-2036); Brief of Amici Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 
The American Civil Liberties Union, The American Jewish Committee, The New York 
Civil Liberties Union, and People for the American Way Foundation at 14-15, Good 
News (No. 99-2036). 
109. Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State at 14. 
110. Id. at 14-15. 
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limited in their cognitive abilities, will not be able to appreciate 
the difference between formal classroom instruction and 
activities that take place after school in the same classrooms. 111 
Such children are likely to perceive school endorsement of any 
activities conducted in the school building. 
Amici also cited psychological research indicating that pre-
adolescent children are more susceptible to peer pressure than 
older children.112 The authors of one brief worry that "an 
elementary school student faced with his or her peers 
attending the Good News Club's meetings would very well feel 
coerced by peer pressure to attend and to 'receive [Jesus 
Christ] as [his or her] Savior."'113 This fear is not alleviated by 
the requirement of parental permission because students not 
allowed to attend Club meetings would feel "excluded, 
different, and diminished within their own school."114 While 
there may be no coercion by school officials themselves to 
participate in Club activities, the sociology of an elementary 
school works to put this pressure on the students. 
Amici also relied on the Equal Access Act115 to support their 
arguments that the age of the children in this case created an 
Establishment Clause concern. 116 The drafters of this Act 
originally included elementary schools in its coverage but 
ultimately limited its provisions to secondary schools after 
widespread objections from members of Congress. 117 These 
objections were based on a concern that young children "are 
unable to appreciate the distinction between neutrality and 
sponsorship, that they lack the maturity to undertake action 
without school supervision and involvement, and that they are 
particularly impressionable and subject to coercion and 
111. There is some confusion over the facts of Good News as to what time the Club 
sought to use the school building for its meetings. There is evidence that they 
petitioned the school board to enter the building prior to the end of the school day so 
that their meeting could begin directly after regular instruction ended. Good News, 21 
F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (1998). 
112. Brief of Anti-Defamation League at 21. 
113. ld. at 21-22. 
114. ld. at 22. 
115. See text accompanying supra n. 25. 
116. Brief of Americans United for Church and State at 15; Brief of Anti-
Defamation League at 22-23; Brief of the American Jewish Congress at 29, Good News 
(No. 99-2036); Brief of National School Boards Association, American Association of 
School Administrators, Horace Mann League at 21, Good News (No. 99-2036). 
117. Brief of Americans United for Church and State at 15. 
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manipulation by others."118 Amici referenced this Act as 
evidence that Congress recognized that there are different 
considerations in assessing potential Establishment Clause 
violations when the audience of a religious message includes 
young children and, in turn, argued that the judicial branch 
should do the same. 
V. AN-AGE SENSITIVE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST 
This section proposes a test for use in Establishment Clause 
cases challenging religious activities in public schools. Under 
this test, the Court must first determine the age range for the 
intended audience of a religious message. If the audience is 
pre-adolescent (generally younger than twelve) the Court 
should consider the extent to which a perception of government 
endorsement of religion is likely. If the audience is older than 
twelve, the Court should determine if the school's position on 
religious activities within the school is neutral toward 
religion. 119 This test does not directly consider the elements of 
the Lemon test because the Court itself has been hesitant to 
use them; however, considerations of endorsement and 
neutrality in this age-sensitive test are derived from Lemon.120 
The idea of separating the two inquiries is not a novel one. 
In arguing that the Court should adopt multiple Establishment 
Clause tests, Justice O'Connor suggested that some cases 
require a consideration of endorsement, while others would be 
better decided on neutrality, although not in the context of age, 
as this article suggests is necessary.121 
118. ld. at 16 n. 8. 
119. For this test to function efficiently, it is necessary to set a bright-line division 
between the two categories of Establishment Clause inquiries. The age of twelve was 
chosen because this tends to be the age where children move from the childish world of 
elementary school into the more adult-like world of middle school or junior high. Using 
the age of twelve essentially allows courts to use one inquiry for elementary schools 
and one for schools that house the higher grades. I chose not to set the line at the level 
of the school itself because some small school districts, like Milford, have only one 
school building for all grades. 
120. Langendorfer, supra n. 19 at 709 (discussing Justice O'Connor's revision of 
the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test into the endorsement test) and at 716 
(examining Justice Souter's use of neutrality to supplement the Lemon test). 
121. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 720 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Some cases ... involve 
government actions targeted at particular individuals or groups, imposing special 
duties or giving special benefits. Cases involving government speech on religious 
topics ... seem to me to fall into a different category and to require an analysis focusing 
on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of religion, rather than on whether the 
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A. Children Younger than Twelve 
As discussed earlier, the Court has attempted to discern 
Establishment Clause violations by considering whether school 
actions may lead students to believe that the school supports or 
endorses the religious activities occurring in the school.122 This 
fear of perceived endorsement has been discredited in cases 
where the students are old enough to understand that a school 
does not endorse all the activities that take place on school 
d 123 groun s. 
It logically follows from the assertion that older students 
will not perceive endorsement, that younger students will, or, 
at least, might perceive it. The Court's reliance on the age and 
maturity of students in cases like Mergens is empty without 
recognition that the cases may have been decided differently if 
the students had been younger. 124 It is inconsistent for the 
Court to rely on age when the students are older and 
cognitively mature but to ignore it when they are young and 
potentially confused by a religious presence in their school. 
Under the prescribed test, the Court would consider 
whether average children under the age of twelve in a 
particular situation would perceive official school endorsement 
of religious activities occurring at the school. This would be a 
context-based inquiry, looking at the children in a particular 
school. The school board most properly makes the decision, and 
the Court should afford such decisions great weight in 
considering challenges to the school board's authority.125 
B. Children Older than Twelve 
Review of previous Supreme Court decisions indicates that 
the Court is not convinced that older students will perceive 
school endorsement of religion solely because religious 
activities are permitted to take place on school property.126 In 
government action is neutral with regard to religion."). 
122. See supra Part II discussing Mergens and Lamb's Chapel. 
123. See supra Part II.C. discussing Rosenberger. 
124. See supra Part II.A. discussing Mergens. See e.g. Brief of Americans United 
for Church and State at 14. 
125. As stated earlier, the Court has long held that decisions regarding public 
education should be made by the local communities and not by federal judges. See 
supra Part liLA. discussing Fraser. 
126. E.g. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-51; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14. 
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light of the psychological research finding that adolescent 
children are more able to engage in abstract, higher order 
thinking, the Court's position on this issue is reasonable. 127 In 
Rosenberger, where the Court was confronted with an 
Establishment Clause defense in the context of a state 
university, it focused not on age, but on the government's 
neutrality towards religion.128 This neutrality inquiry makes 
sense when the audience is composed of older students. Where 
there is no reasonable fear of perceived school endorsement, 
the government's priority should be to create policies that are 
neutral toward religion. 
Under the proposed test, if the intended audience is 
composed of students older than twelve, the Court must 
determine whether the school board's policy on extra-curricular 
activities is neutral toward religion. An appropriate policy 
would allow religious groups to meet in the school on the same 
terms as other organizations. In many of the situations where 
members of an intended audience are older than twelve, the 
Equal Access Act would control, as this audience would be 
composed of students at a secondary school.129 
C. Applying the Test to Good News 
The benefits of an age-sensitive Establishment Clause test 
can most clearly be seen by considering how it would have 
affected the outcome of Good News. Before addressing this 
question, however, it must be remembered that the Court in 
Good News considered the relevant audience to be the parents 
of the schoolchildren, and not the children themselves. 130 This 
represented a fundamental flaw in the Court's reasoning, 
regardless of what test the Court used to evaluate the 
Establishment Clause argument. The Club sought access to the 
school in order to share its religious message with the children 
in attendance. While parental permission was required for 
127. See supra Part IV.B. discussing psychological research cited in amicus briefs. 
128. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-846. 
129. See supra Part II.A with accompanying text and footnotes. 
130. Good News, 533 U.S. at 115 ("[T]o the extent we consider whether the 
community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club's activities, the relevant 
community would be the parents, not the elementary school children. It is the parents 
who choose whether their children will attend the Good News Club meetings. Because 
the children cannot attend without their parents' permission, they cannot be coerced 
into engaging in the Good News Club's religious activities."). 
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students to attend Club meetings, the parents were not the 
intended recipients of the religious message. The students of 
the Milford Central School, both those who attended the Club 
meetings and those who did not, represented the audience that 
would be affected by the presence of the Club in the school. The 
children would be aware that the Club met in the school 
building and could potentially perceive official school 
endorsement of the club's activities simply by virtue of its 
presence in the school. Even though the children would know 
that parental permission was required to attend the meetings, 
they could still perceive endorsement because there are other 
school activities that require parental permission that are 
school endorsed. 131 While it is not inappropriate for the Court to 
consider the perspective of the parents of Milford school 
children, the Court must also consider the perspective of the 
intended audience of the religious message. In this case, that 
audience is Milford school children, ages six to twelve. 132 
Assuming that the Court chose the correct audience for its 
Establishment Clause inquiry, under the test proposed in this 
Article, the Court would then consider whether a reasonable 
child between the ages of six and twelve would perceive school 
endorsement of the Club's activities. This is a fact-based 
inquiry, and many of the necessary facts were not part of the 
record of this case as it came up as an appeal of the lower 
court's grant of Defendant's motion for summary judgment.133 
The Court would have to remand this case for further fact-
finding. There are three basic sets of facts to consider: the other 
clubs and organizations that were permitted to meet in the 
school building, the format of the Club's meetings, and the time 
the Club sought to use the building. 
From the record it appears that only three other 
organizations were permitted to meet in the school building: 
the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, and the 4-H Club.134 This may 
lead to an enhanced risk that the children would perceive 
endorsement of the Good News Club's activities. The school 
131. Brief for Americans United for Church and State at 22 ("A child who is sent 
home with a permission slip [to attend Good News Club meetings], much like the one 
his parents complete to allow him to participate in a school-sponsored field trip, is 
likely to perceive this as the school's promotion of the event."). 
132. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103. 
133. Good News, 533 U.S. at 104. 
134. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
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established a limited public forum, and the record suggests 
that this forum was not widely used by the community for non-
school related activities. It is likely that the children were 
unaccustomed to adults entering the building for purposes 
other than regular classroom instruction. It is also likely that 
the younger students perceived that the other clubs using the 
school for meetings were related to official school instruction, 
because they thought of the school as being used solely for 
school-related activities. While there are no constitutional 
concerns with students perceiving endorsement of the 4-H 
Club, perceived endorsement of a religious message violates the 
Establishment Clause under this test. 
If the facts indicated that the school building was used by a 
number of community organizations for various purposes and 
that the students were aware of these uses, the risk of student 
perception of endorsement of each of these activities would 
diminish. If the young students saw the school building being 
frequently used for obviously nonschool-related activities, such 
as dance classes or adult organization meetings, they would be 
more likely to understand that not everything that happens in 
the school building is part of the official curriculum. Justice 
Marshall made a similar argument in his concurrence m 
Mergens: 
But the crucial question is how the [Equal Access] Act 
affects each school. If a school already houses numerous 
ideological organizations, then the addition of a religion 
club will most likely not violate the Establishment 
Clause because the risk that students will erroneously 
attribute the views of the religion club to the school is 
minimal. .. But if the religion club is the sole advocacy-
oriented group in the forum ... then the school's failure 
to disassociate itself from the religious activity will 
reasonably be understood as an endorsement of that 
t o 't }35 ac 1v1 y. 
135. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 266 (Marshall, J., concurring). For a discussion offorum 
domination by religious groups see Steven G. Gray, The No Religion Zone: 
Constitutional Limitations on Religious Association in the Public Sphere, 85 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1885, 1902-1903 (2001) ("Private religious domination of public forum is 
problematic in a general way because it communicates to society that a particular 
religious group has a favored status not shared by other religious groups [or 
nonreligious individuals]. Furthermore, it is particularly problematic because it forces 
nonadherents of the dominant religion to forego access to the forum to avoid 
participating in the favored religion's sectarian activities."). 
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While the issues in Mergens differ from Good News in that 
Mergens deals with the Equal Access Act and a high school, 
Marshall's sentiment remains relevant here. Where the wider 
community routinely uses a school building for broad purposes, 
students will be more likely to consider the building to be a 
community institution where they attend classes and 
sometimes go for other purposes. Although they may not be 
able to engage in abstract thinking,136 students will understand 
the function of their school in the context in which they 
experience it. 
Another factual inquiry concerns the format of the Club 
meetings. A number of amici argued that the Club was 
structured too much like a regular class and that this would 
contribute to a misunderstanding that the Club was part of 
official school instruction. 137 The record contains a brief 
description ofthe format of Club meetings: 
The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking 
attendance. As she calls a child's name, if the child 
recites a Bible verse the child receives a treat. After 
attendance, the Club sings songs. Next Club members 
engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning Bible 
verses. Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible story and 
explains how it applies to Club members' lives. The 
Club closes with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier 
distributes treats and Bible verses for memorization.138 
Again, however, the record would have to be developed further 
in order to determine the extent to which the Club meetings 
resemble normal classroom instruction. 
The concern is that children would be more likely to 
perceive endorsement if the Club meetings proceeded like 
classes. If the meeting was conducted by a single individual 
standing at the chalkboard while the children sat at desks in 
rows, the children would be more likely to equate the Club 
meeting with formal classroom instruction. If the Club meeting 
varied from this traditional model of classroom learning, the 
participants and observers would have an easier time 
distinguishing the Club from school. This could be 
accomplished by using multiple instructors, alternative seating 
136. See supra Part IV. B. discussing psychological research cited in amicus briefs. 
137. Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State at 26; Brief of 
the American Jewish Congress at 25-26. 
138. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103. 
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arrangements, and encouraging behavior not customary m 
traditional classrooms, like talking without raising hands or 
walking around the room at will. 
Perception of endorsement derived from the structure of 
Club meetings is more likely to affect those students attending 
the meeting than students who do not attend, but either hear 
about the meetings second-hand or pass by the classroom and 
look inside. This does not reduce the importance of this factual 
inquiry into the format of club meetings. While children need 
parental permission to attend the meetings, receipt of this 
permission does not relax the school's constitutional obligations 
to the students in attendance. Even if the perception of 
endorsement of the club meeting has positive effects on the 
children, the requirement that students not be confused as to 
the school's role in the religious activities occurring within the 
school building is a constant one that cannot be excused. A 
related factual inquiry considers the time the Club requested to 
use the building. This fact was not clear from the record in 
Good News. If the Club met directly after regular school 
sessions ended, children would be more likely to think that the 
meeting was part of the curriculum. This was another concern 
raised by the amici.139 If students had to return home first and 
then be driven back to the school by their parents, they would 
be more likely to distinguish Club meetings from official 
classroom instruction because ofthe lapse in time. 140 
It is clear that the Court would have had to remand this 
case in order to decide it using the age-sensitive test for 
Establishment Clause violations. An argument was made that 
the Court should have done so anyway.141 But using this age-
sensitive test would have produced a result that was 
reasonable for the Milford School District and the children 
attending Milford Central School. If there were facts 
legitimating the concern that the children would perceive 
official school endorsement of the Club's activities and 
message, the Club would have been forced to find an 
139. Brief of Amercians United for Separation of Church and State at 17-19; Brief 
of the American Jewish Congress at 24; Brief of Anti-Defamation League at 24-26; 
Brief of the New York State School Board Association, Inc. at 10-11, Good News (No. 
99-2036); Brief ofN ational School Boards Association at 17-18. 
140. While this may be inconvenient for parents, it is not the responsibility of the 
public school system to provide convenient access to religious instruction. 
141. Good News, 533 U.S. at 140-141 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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alternative site for its meetings or adjust the format or timing 
of their meetings to eliminate the potential for confusion. If the 
facts indicated that the children in the school would not 
reasonably perceive endorsement, the Club would then be 
permitted to meet in the manner and time requested. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The debate over what the Framers intended in drafting the 
Establishment Clause began immediately after ratification of 
the Constitution and has continued ever since. Some rely on 
Thomas Jefferson's sentiment when he wrote in a letter that a 
"wall of separation" should divide church and state.142 Others 
look to the tradition of religion in the founding of this country 
and argue that the Framers could not have intended to restrict 
all government aid to religion.143 This debate is not one that can 
be brought to the Supreme Court for a final adjudication. 
Disputes over the appropriate relationship between religion 
and government will likely continue indefinitely, regardless of 
how the Court approaches the issue in individual cases. 
The best the Court can do is to try to ensure that the 
government "make[s] no law respecting an establishment of 
religion."144 At this point in history, exactly what this means in 
any given situation is unclear. Recent Court decisions indicate 
that government policies that create a perception of official 
endorsement of religion or that are not neutral toward religion 
violate this constitutional mandate, but the Court may change 
its position on these policies in a future case. The fate of the 
Lemon test shows that no test is invincible; but whatever 
method the Court uses to decide these cases, it must 
acknowledge that different concerns arise when the forum for a 
religious message is a public elementary school and when the 
audience of such a message includes young children. The Court 
has recognized this in the context of free speech and has 
allowed school administrators to censor student speech to the 
extent necessary to preserve order and protect younger, less 
mature students from the psychological harm that may result 
142. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers' Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 
2001 BYU L. Rev. 755, 761 (2001). 
143. See e.g. id.; Mark W. Cordes, Politics, Religion, and the First Amendment, 50 
DePaul L. Rev. 111 (2000). 
144. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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from being exposed to disruptive or inappropriate speech. 
Educators need the same power to limit religious activities in 
schools to ensure that all students feel that their religious 
beliefs are respected, both by the school and the state. 
Chelsea Chaffee 
